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Abstract
In a simple cash-credit model, I study the eﬀects of the combination of costly tax collection
and tax evasion on ﬁscal and monetary policy for optimal resource allocation. Allowing the
informal sector to use cash more intensively than the formal sector, I compute the optimal
interest and tax rates for eleven OECD countries to ﬁnance their exogeneously given gov-
ernment spending. A comparison of the actual and optimal interest rates reveals that tax
collection costs and tax evasion together can partly explain the cross-country diﬀerences in
monetary policy, also rationalizing deviations from the Friedman Rule in the long-run.
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11 Introduction
Collecting 1 dollar in taxes cost 1.60 cents in Portugal in year 2000, almost four times as much as
in the US, according to the OECD (2004). In fact, Portugal is no exception, there are countries
with higher tax administration costs, and the Internal Revenue Services is not operating on a
modest budget either1. On the other hand, increasing the money supply by 1 dollar is virtually
costless for any central bank. New printed banknotes are mostly used to replace the worn out bills
— a service provided to the public to facilitate trade, so that the printing cost of an additional
dollar remains negligible2.
Furthermore, in many countries, including the industrialized ones, there is a nontrivial fraction
of the economy evading taxes but engaged in legal economic activities otherwise. This sector uses
cash intensively because it helps to avoid transactions being traced back, and is therefore also
referred to as the cash economy in the literature. Faced with a costly tax collection system and
a cash economy together, one could argue that governments might ﬁnd printing money a cheap
and easy way of “collecting” inﬂation tax. Thus relying on inﬂationary ﬁnance could be optimal
from the governments’ perspective.
The purpose of this paper is to consider tax evasion and costly tax collection in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework and to quantitatively analyze their impact on monetary and ﬁscal
policy for optimal resource allocation. Using a simple cash-credit model I calculate long-run
optimal interest and tax rates to ﬁnance an exogeneously given government spending for 11 OECD
countries. I ﬁnd that tax evasion and costly consumption taxes can together explain some of the
variation in monetary and ﬁscal policies across countries. In fact, the model predicts optimal
interest rates that are quite close to actual ones for many of the countries in the sample, thus
rationalizing the observed deviations from the Friedman Rule. Thus I also conﬁrm the robustness
of previous estimates of optimal interest rates reported in Ye¸ sin (2004) where costly income taxes
and tax evasion were modeled. Comparison of optimal and actual seigniorage revenues reveals
that at least some governments were inﬂating optimally to create seigniorage revenue for ﬁnancing
1E.g., according to the oﬃcial numbers, IRS budget was about than 2.5 times the budget of the FBI in 1998.
2Nonetheless, according to the Federal Reserve Board, approximately 8.23 billions of banknotes were printed in
2005, half of which were in 1 and 5 dollar denominations. Less than 10% of the new notes were denominated as
50 and 100 dollars. It cost about 458 million dollars to print banknotes worth 142.2 billions of dollars, i.e. about
0.003 cents per dollar.
2their expenditures — albeit they were not always on the “correct” side of a seigniorage Laﬀer
Curve.
I model the consumption goods sector following Nicolini (1998) with the additional assumption
that consumption taxes are costly to collect for the government. This is a crucial assumption
since it changes the government’s problem and hence its optimal policy decision in a signiﬁcant
way. For example, in this model, the optimal interest rate for the US is computed to be higher
than what Nicolini (1998) estimates3, and closer to the long-run average. Using the recently
available data set on tax collection costs in OECD (2004), I show that the contribution of costly
collection procedures to the optimal level of interest rates is signiﬁcant, even though the costs are
not too high.
There are several reasons why consumption taxes are used in the model instead of — or in
combination with — income taxes. First, the model is simple and tractable and can give the
main intuition also without income taxes. Second, no speciﬁc assumption is needed regarding
which type of tax is more costly to collect. Third, modeling the choice of working in the formal
or informal sector is avoided here. This might be essential, since there are no estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between formal and informal sector across countries4. In fact, in a
related paper with costly income taxes and tax evasion, Ye¸ sin (2004) ﬁnds that the optimal
interest rates are sensitive to the choice of this parameter in the estimations. Thus with this
model, the robustness of the previous results can be checked as well. Fourth, although most
countries rely on a combination of income and consumption taxes as instruments, consumption
taxes have become more and more important throughout the world in the recent years due to
their simplicity to administer and to collect. For example, 29 out of 30 OECD countries as of
2006 have a Value Added Tax (VAT) or a Goods and Services Tax (GST)5. Thus the model here
can be seen as the case when the governments rely solely on consumption taxes. And last but
not least, in this model cash usage can be assumed to be more intensive in the informal sector
3The optimal interest rate for the US in Nicolini (1998) and in this paper are not directly comparable since the
baseline values both papers try to match in the calibrations are diﬀerent. Nicolini (1998) matches data for 1982
when the size of the government was higher than its long-run average. This variable, in turn, increases the optimal
interest rates.
4This parameter is estimated only for Canada by Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994).
5The US is the only OECD member country without a federal value added type tax on consumer expenditure,
although most of its states administer sales taxes.
3than in the formal sector to reﬂect the common perception.
In the model and/or estimations I abstract from several things, including time-variation of in-
terest rates, determinants of government spending, tax collection for redistributive purposes, tax
burden on the consumers, the interdependence of tax collection costs and tax evasion, dollariza-
tion, the commitment problem of the government, tax collection costs incurred by the consumers,
and the decision on working in the formal or informal sector.
Table 1 lists tax collection cost data reported in OECD (2004) for the sample for 2000-2002.
Although there is some time-variation of the fraction of net tax revenues needed to ﬁnance the
tax authority’s budget, the values look stable over time and seem to be driven largely by country
speciﬁcs6. In the estimations I approximate the eﬃciency of the tax collection system for each
country as one minus the average unit cost of tax collection and assume a linear tax collection cost
function7. Data on average interest rates, seigniorage revenues, the size of the government, and
tax revenues as a fraction of the output during 1976-2000 are given in Table 2. The variation in
these variables across countries is remarkable. Table 2 also reports the size of the informal sector in
1989-1993 for the sample estimated by Schneider and Enste (2000) and ¨ O˘ g¨ un¸ c and Yılmaz (2000).
I report the range implied by their estimates and use the midpoint in my estimations. Figures
1, 2, and 3 demonstrate the main hypotheses of this paper that for countries with higher tax
collection costs and/or larger informal sector, the average interest rates and seigniorage revenues
have been indeed higher in the past. For more detailed info on the data used here see Ye¸ sin
(2004).
In the estimations I vary the relative cash intensity of the informal sector, as done in Nicolini
(1998). First assuming that cash usage in the formal and informal sector is the same, I calculate
a lower bound for optimal interest rates and an upper bound for optimal tax rates. Then I let the
informal sector to be twice and ﬁve times more cash intensive to see how sensitive the estimates
are. Although optimal interest rates increase with the informal sector’s cash usage, the eﬀect
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from country to country depending on the country’s speciﬁc situation
including the size of its government and the size of its informal sector. Since the cash intensity
6These costs refer to both income and consumption tax collection. Unfortunately, separate data is not available
to assess which tax is more costly to collect.
7A linear tax collection cost function is assumed for three reasons: 1. for the sake of simplicity, 2. annual IRS
budget and tax collection data during 1976-2000 does not suggest otherwise, 3. to make the new results regarding
optimal interest rates comparable with the existing literature.
4of the informal sector has not been estimated empirically before, one should bear in mind that
the relative cash intensity of the informal sector is probably not the same in each country.
Another important aspect is whether taxes on the cash good are paid in cash or not. Since
there is no commonly used convention in the literature, I consider both versions of the cash-in-
advance constraints for the model, and report my results in the main body of the paper and
in the appendix. The conclusion that inﬂationary ﬁnance might have been chosen optimally by
some governments remain supported in both versions of the economy.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 describes
the model, Section 4 gives the quantitative results and Section 5 concludes. The results for the
alternative speciﬁcation of the cash-in-advance constraint are given in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The Friedman Rule states that for optimal resource allocation in the economy, net nominal
interest rates should be zero. This ‘Ramsey problem’ result has been proven to be robust for a
wide range of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with income or consumption taxes.
The results are summarized in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Correia and Teles (1999),
and Chari and Kehoe (1999), among others. These models assume that the collection of taxes
is not costly for the government in the same way as money printing is not. Neither is there tax
evasion modeled. Thus optimality requires that money should not be taxed because it can be
considered as an intermediate input from the consumer’s perspective.
There have been some attempts in the literature to explain the deviations from the Friedman
Rule for single countries, mainly by assuming tax evasion. For example, Nicolini (1998) calculates
optimal interest rates for the US and Peru in a cash-credit model assuming the presence of an
informal sector within the economy. The optimal interest rate for Peru in the year 1982 is
calculated to be between 9% and 19%, depending on the cash intensity of the informal sector,
even when the informal sector is assumed to be quite large, namely 40% of the oﬃcial economy.
Since in 1982 nominal interest rates in Peru were around 60%, he concludes that massive tax
evasion in Peru does not explain the deviation of the interest rates from the Friedman Rule.
However, he notes that optimal interest rates depend not only on the size of the informal sector,
but also largely on the size of the government. In fact, Peru with a relatively small government
5should not have needed to rely much on inﬂationary ﬁnance.
Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003), on the other hand, assume the presence of a similar informal
sector in the economy and prove that the Friedman Rule is not optimal. Using the US economy as
a baseline, they ﬁnd that for alternative calibrations the annual optimal inﬂation can range from
0% to 22%; however, they do not take a stand on how to interpret their numbers and compare
them with actual interest rates.
In a shopping time model de Fiore (2000) shows that there are conditions under which the
Friedman Rule is still optimal despite the presence of tax collection costs. She estimates optimal
annual interest rates for the US at less than 1% even when the tax collection generates losses as
high as 20% of the revenue.
Ye¸ sin (2004) is the ﬁrst attempt to systematically analyze cross-country diﬀerences in mon-
etary policy taking into account the fact that income taxes imply collection costs whereas ﬁat
money can be printed without cost in the Ramsey Problem framework, and also the ﬁrst to esti-
mate tax collection costs for a variety of countries. In that study, I ﬁnd that for some countries
the optimal and actual interest rates are quite close to each other, and I also show that optimal
interest rates are sensitive to the parameter choice for the elasticity of substitution between for-
mal and informal labor. Since there is no literature estimating this parameter for a variety of
countries, no further progress is possible for this line of enquiry. On the other hand, in this paper
the informal sector is assumed to be in the ﬁnal goods sector, thus the decision on whether to
work for the informal or formal sector does not need to be explicitly modeled; and the parameter
choice issue can be avoided. Furthermore, this papers makes use of a newly available data set on
tax collection costs in OECD (2004) improving the precision of the estimations.
The link between currency demand and the informal sector (in terms of tax pressure) was
ﬁrst analyzed by Cagan (1958) and then developed by Tanzi (1980) and Tanzi (1983). On page
313 Cagan (1958) describes the link between currency demand and the informal sector in the US
as follows:
“The use of currency to conceal taxable transactions was probably higher during and
after the war, primarily because income tax rates were raised substantially early in
World War II and have not been appreciably reduced since. Income received, held,
and spent without prior deposit in a bank usually deﬁes detection. A tax on income
6thus leads some people to receive income and make expenditures as far as possible
without the use of checks.”
Therefore it is important to consider cash usage in the informal sector when estimating optimal
interest rates.
3 Model
This simple cash-credit model with informal and formal sectors is based on Nicolini (1998). There
is a continuum of consumption goods indexed by the interval [0,1]. The representative agent’s
















where U is increasing and concave, and V is increasing and convex; ct(z) is consumption of good
z at time t, nt is time allocated to work at time t, and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
There is a constant returns to scale technology that can transform one unit of labor into one
unit of output. There are four types of consumption goods: informal credit, informal cash, formal
cash and formal credit goods. More speciﬁcally, the unit interval of the consumption goods can
be partitioned as
[0,1] =








formal sector z }| {
(a + b,a + b + c]
| {z }
cash goods
∪(a + b + c,1]
| {z }
credit goods
where a, b, and c are positive real numbers such that their sum is lower than 1. I assume that all
goods in [0,a+b] are traded in the informal market, which is not registered with the government.
The goods in (a + b,1] are traded in the formal market. Moreover, all goods in (a,a + b + c)
must be traded using cash, i.e. they are cash goods. The goods in [0,a]∪(a+b+c,1] are credit
goods. Here a, b, c, and d = 1 − a − b − c represent the relative sizes of the four diﬀerent goods
markets. In the quantitative part, I will assume that the informal sector may make greater use
of cash than the formal sector.
Each period, the government prints money, issues one-period bonds that pay a gross nominal
interest rate R, and collects consumption taxes for the goods traded in the formal sector to ﬁnance
7a given stream of government spending. While collecting the consumption taxes, however, the
government incurs tax collection or enforcement costs.
Let the tax collection cost function be linear in the total tax revenue:
φ(T) = (1 − κ)T (2)
where T is the total nominal value of taxes collected by the government, and κ is the eﬃciency
parameter of the tax system8 such that 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
Since the government can only collect consumption taxes for the goods traded in the formal
sector of this economy

for z ∈ (a + b,1)

, the government’s budget constraint in period t is
RtBt + p
g













where {gt}t is a given stream of government consumption expenditures, τt is the uniform con-
sumption tax rate in the formal sector, Mt is the nominal money supply, Bt is the nominal
bond supply, p
g
t is the price of government consumption expenditures, and pt(z) is the price of
consumption good z at time t.
The consumer faces a cash-in-advance constraint for the cash good. Since there is no common
convention in the literature I will consider two cases in order to ensure that the analysis is
complete. The ﬁrst cash-in-advance constraint I consider is identical to what Nicolini (1998)
assumes. In (4) the consumer does not have to pay the tax on the formal cash good in cash. But
I also consider the other case, (4’), where the consumption tax on the formal cash good must be


















The results in the main body of this paper are based on the cash-in-advance constraint (4).
However, I do the whole analysis with (4’) as well and report my ﬁndings in the Appendix.
The period budget constraint of the consumer is













t nt + Mt + BtRt (5)
8Equivalently, 1 − κ is the unit cost of tax collection. This is the same tax collection cost function as in Ye¸ sin
(2004).
8where pn
t is the price of labor, nt.




, (5), and initial
wealth and non-negativity conditions. To rule out Ponzi schemes, I let real bond holdings be
bounded above and below, which will not be binding in equilibrium.














, and government policy is π = {τt}∞
t=0.
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a government policy, π, a price system, q, and an
allocation, s, such that
1. given π and q, the allocation s solves the representative consumer’s utility maximization
problem.
2. given π and q, the government’s budget constraint (3) is satisﬁed for all t.
Given the technology, it must be true that at any equilibrium the prices of consumption goods,




t = pt for all z ∈ [0,1] for all t
Therefore the resource constraint on this economy at time t is
nt = gt +
Z 1
0






The last term in (6) denotes resources wasted during the tax collection process.
It is assumed that the government has a commitment technology and can bind itself to the
optimal policy at time zero.
Deﬁnition 2. A Ramsey equilibrium is an allocation, s, for the consumer and a government


















subject to the constraint that there exists {Mt,Bt,τt}∞






is a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Since there are no diﬀerences among the goods in a given market, at any equilibrium, the
consumption levels in a given market will be identical. From now on, I will drop the notation with
9z whenever possible, and use the following variables instead: Denote the credit informal goods

when z ∈ (0,a)

as yI
t, the cash informal goods

when z ∈ (a,a+b)

as xI
t, the cash formal goods

when z ∈ (a + b,a + b + c)

as xF
t , and ﬁnally the credit formal goods





It should also be noted that for consumers to be willing to hold bonds, the rate of return must
be at least equal to the rate of return on ﬁat money. Hence, the gross nominal interest rate must
be greater or equal to 1.
The following proposition enables us to simplify the Ramsey Problem for the economy speciﬁed
above.
Proposition 1. [Ramsey Allocation] The consumption and labor allocations in a competitive
equilibrium satisfy:
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t ,nt ≥ 0 (13)
Furthermore, the allocations that satisfy the above equations can be decentralized as a compet-
itive equilibrium.
Proof. : Although straightforward, the proof is tedious and has therefore been omitted here. See
Ye¸ sin (2004) for an analogous proof using income taxes.
The intuitive interpretations of the above constraints are as follows: (7) resembles the resource
constraint where the consumer’s ﬁrst order condition for the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption of formal credit good and labor has been substituted as the tax rate. Constraint
(8) is called the implementability constraint in the literature. It is a single life-time budget
10constraint of the consumer where prices have been eliminated using the ﬁrst order conditions of
his maximization problem. Constraint (9) states that the nominal interest rate is greater than 1,
since for the consumer’s problem a ﬁrst order condition is that the marginal rate of substitution
between informal cash good and informal credit good is equal to the nominal interest rate. (10)
assures that informal credit good is not taxed, and constraint (11) imposes the requirement that
the consumption tax in the formal sector be the same for both cash and credit goods. Here, it
should be noted that when the government increases inﬂation to reduce the distortion between
informal cash and formal credit goods, it increases the distortion between formal cash and formal
credit goods at the same time. Thus there is a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and consumption taxes.
Constraint (12) guarantees that the consumption tax rate is positive; otherwise tax collection costs
would be meaningless. And ﬁnally, (13) assures that consumption and labor are non-negative.
Hence, the Ramsey Problem is to maximize (1) subject to (7)-(13). Note that conditions (12)
and (13) will not be binding in a Ramsey equilibrium.
4 Quantitative Results




for c > 0
and
V (n) = n for n ≥ 0
Let government expenditure, g, be constant for each period, and let us consider the steady state
solution to the Ramsey Problem. A period is assumed to be one year. I choose the parameters so
that the resulting competitive equilibrium matches US macroeconomic data. Five observations
are used in the calibration:
The size of the informal sector relative to the size of the formal economy can be stated as
i =
a ∗ yI(τ,R) + b ∗ xI(τ,R)
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R) + g + τ ∗ (1 − κ)
 
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R)

where yI(τ,R), xI(τ,R), xF(τ,R), and yF(τ,R) are consumer demand functions9 given the values
of τ, R and σ. Note that the denominator consists of private consumption of the goods traded in
9For the utility function speciﬁed above, the demand functions are very easy to derive.
11the formal sector, government expenditures and the resources wasted during tax collection. For
1989-1993 Schneider and Enste (2000) estimate the informal sector in the US to be between 6.7%
and 13.9%. In my calibration of this model I use the midpoint of this range, which is 10.3%.
The size of the government as a fraction of the formal economy in the model is
v =
g + τ ∗ (1 − κ) ∗
 
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R)

c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R) + g + (1 − κ) ∗ τ ∗
 
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R)

In the US, government consumption was on average 19.75% of oﬃcial GDP in 1976-2000.
The real quantity of money as a fraction of the oﬃcial output can be calculated as
m =
b ∗ xI(τ,R) + c ∗ xF(τ,R)
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R) + g + (1 − κ) ∗ τ ∗
 
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R)

The nominal money supply, M1, was on average 15.08% of the oﬃcial nominal GDP in 1976-2000
in the US according to the SourceOECD.
As it is explained in the introduction, the informal sector is thought to be more cash-intensive






where θ ≥ 1 is the relative cash intensity of the informal sector. However, the parameter θ has
not been estimated numerically yet for any country. For this reason I ﬁrst assume that θ = 1
and ﬁnd a lower bound for the optimal interest rate and an upper bound for the optimal tax rate
in the US. Then I assume θ = 2 and θ = 5 and solve the problem again for the cases when the
informal sector is twice or ﬁve times more cash intensive than the formal sector in order to get
an idea of how sensitive the results are to the choice of the parameter θ.
Finally, all four sectors together should total 1. This is the identity equation.
a + b + c + d = 1
The value of R is obtained from the International Financial Statistics. In the US, the annual
net nominal interest rates were 6.67% on average in 1976-2000. The tax rate, τ, is estimated by
dividing total net tax revenues by the oﬃcial output. The tax revenue data is obtained from the
SourceOECD website. In the US, net tax revenue was 26.61% of the oﬃcial GDP in 1976-2000.
As in Nicolini (1998), I set σ = 2 for the US which is consistent with the existing literature. The
eﬃciency parameter of the tax system, κ, is assumed to be 0.9953 based on the OECD estimates.
12Table 3 reports the baseline values for the US, and table 4 reports the baseline parameters
calibrated using these baseline values. With these calibrated baseline parameters, the Ramsey
annual nominal interest rate in the US is estimated at 5.42%. This corresponds to 2.26% annual
optimal inﬂation rate when the annual discount factor, β, is assumed to be 0.97. The optimal
tax rate on consumption, on the other hand, is 23.23%; in equilibrium 95.79% of the government
expenditures are ﬁnanced by the tax revenue.
When κ is assumed to be 1, i.e. taxes are not costly to collect, then the optimal annual
interest rate is 3.78%, and the optimal annual inﬂation rate is 0.67%. Thus even when the tax
collection cost is small, it changes the government’s optimization problem in a crucial way and
increases the optimal interest rate signiﬁcantly.
If the informal sector is assumed to be twice as cash intensive as the formal sector, that is
when θ = 2, then the optimal interest rate for the US is estimated to be 7.28%. This estimate is
even closer to, albeit higher than, the long-run average interest rate. And if θ = 5, the optimal
interest rate is even higher at 10.02%. Unlike most of the previous results in the literature on
optimal interest rates, actual and optimal interest rates for the US are quite close to each other.
The combination of tax collection costs with the existence of an informal sector appear to explain
the deviation from the Friedman Rule in the US in 1976-2000.
I carry out the same analysis for the group of countries in Table 1. The base values for these
countries are given in Table 5. For each of these countries, data on interest rates, government
expenditures and nominal GDP were obtained from the International Financial Statistics. The
average tax rate and the real quantity of money were calculated using the SourceOECD data.
The size of the informal sector is taken from Schneider and Enste (2000) and from ¨ O˘ g¨ un¸ c and
Yılmaz (2000) — in my estimations I have used the midpoints of the ranges provided in those
papers. The eﬃciency parameter of the tax system, κ, is taken from OECD (2004) with the
exceptions of Italy and Mexico. For these two countries no OECD estimates were available, so κ
is assumed to be the average value in the sample as 0.99. The preference parameter σ is assumed
to be 2 for all these countries, as it was for the US. Again, for each country three values of θ,
namely θ = 1, 2, and 5, are considered, and the estimations are performed for each case.
Table 6 reports the optimal interest rates in comparison with 25-year average values and with
optimal values reported in Ye¸ sin (2004). One observation is that for many of the countries in the
sample the actual and the optimal interest rates are quite close to each other, with the exceptions
13of Mexico and Turkey. This is not too surprising considering the commonly held belief that these
countries were not on the “correct” side of a seigniorage Laﬀer curve. Figure 4 shows that Mexico
and Turkey are outliers in the sample, even when we assume that cash intensity in the informal
sector is 5 times as much as in the formal sector. The disparity between the optimal numbers
reported here as opposed to in Ye¸ sin (2004) arises not only due to diﬀerent models used, but
mainly due to diﬀerent values assumed for tax collection costs10.
For most of the countries the model predicts optimal interest rates close to the long-run
averages and it explains some of the cross-country variation in nominal interest rates. Hence
optimality considerations with regard to costly taxes and tax evasion seem to account partly for
the diﬀerences in monetary policy across countries. Other factors — possibly politico-economic
ones — may be responsible for the remaining variation in nominal interest rates. This result is
consistent with the ﬁndings in Ye¸ sin (2004).
Table 6 and 8 show that the optimal interest rate is increasing and the optimal tax rate is
decreasing in the cash intensity of the informal sector, respectively. Intuitively, this makes sense,
since the government would rely on the inﬂation tax more, if the informal sector uses cash much
more than the formal sector. However, one should also note that the relative positions of the
countries change as the cash intensity of the informal sector increases, e.g. see how much the
optimal interest rate increases in the US and in Korea, respectively, when θ increases from 1 to 5
in Figure 4. The fact that optimal interest rates in the US increase much rapidly than in Korea
is largely due to the fact that the government spending that needs to be ﬁnanced in the US is
much larger than in Korea. Such a government would have to rely more on seigniorage11. This
observation can be also seen in Table 7 and Figure 5.
According to the model, all the countries except Mexico and Turkey had lower seigniorage
revenues than what was optimal. Table 7 and Figure 6 demonstrate this ﬁnding. Comparison of
average and optimal tax rates in Table 8 yields to the conclusion that in the sample tax burden
was much higher than needed for optimal resource allocation. However, one should note that this
is a representative agent model and does not consider the income redistribution purposes of tax
10Since the OECD (2004) estimates for tax collection costs have become available only recently, Ye¸ sin (2004)
tries to estimate them for the ﬁrst time for a variety of countries in the literature and does not have accurate
numbers in some cases.
11This ﬁnding is consistent with Nicolini (1998).
14collection such as in Denmark or Norway.
Figure 7 exhibits optimal combinations of tax and interest rates for each country in the
sample as the cash intensity of the informal sector increases. Note that for some countries, such
as Denmark, the sensitivity of optimal tax rate to the parameter θ is relatively higher compared
to other countries, such as Turkey, even though the sensitivity of optimal interest rate to the
parameter θ seems to be similar in both countries.
Finally, Table 9 lists what fraction of the government spending should be ﬁnanced by taxes for
each country. The rest is paid by new money printing and borrowing. Note that the reliance on
tax revenue gets smaller as θ increases. Assuming that the informal sector is more cash intensive
makes tax collection less attractive as a way of ﬁnancing government expenditures.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I consider two potentially important reasons to rely at least partly on inﬂationary
ﬁnance: tax collection costs and tax evasion. The model described in Nicolini (1998) is extended
to incorporate a costly tax collection system whereas ﬁat money can be printed without cost.
This assumption is crucial, since it changes the government’s problem and its optimal decision in
a signiﬁcant way. Although tax collection costs do not appear to be high across countries in the
data, they do contribute to the optimal interest rates considerably.
Informal sector is assumed to be in the ﬁnal goods sector, therefore no explicit assumption
is needed regarding the elasticity of substitution between informal and formal labor. Using this
simple cash-credit model I compute the optimal interest and tax rates for 11 OECD countries.
I ﬁnd that for many countries in the sample, except Mexico and Turkey, the long-run average
interest rates and optimal values implied by the model are quite close to each other, and the
variation in monetary policy across countries and the deviations from the Friedman Rule can
partly be explained by tax collection costs and tax evasion. Thus the results in Ye¸ sin (2004) are
robust to the choice of income or consumption taxes.
I also estimate optimal consumption tax rates and compare them with long-run average tax
rates. In all cases, optimal tax rates are found to be smaller than actual rates. Furthermore, the
reliance on tax revenue gets smaller as the cash-intensity of the informal sector increases, since
inﬂation tax becomes a more eﬃcient way of collecting revenue. The size of the government turns
15out to be an important parameter, as the optimal tax and interest rates depend strongly on the
government spending level that needs to be ﬁnanced. Another contribution of this paper is to use
the recently available data set in OECD (2004) on tax collection costs making the estimations
more precise.
166 Appendix
If the Consumption Tax on the Formal Cash Good must be Paid in Cash:
If the cash-in-advance constraint (4’) is used instead of (4) in the model, Proposition 1 still

















In the calibration, only the formula for money holdings as a fraction of the nominal output
changes — since the tax on the formal cash good is assumed to be paid in cash. Hence
m =
b ∗ xI(τ,R) + (1 + τ) ∗ c ∗ xF(τ,R)
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R) + g + τ ∗ (1 − κ)
 
c ∗ xF(τ,R) + d ∗ yF(τ,R)

Table 10 lists the optimal interest rates based on the alternative cash-in-advance constraint.
The optimal interest rates are not too diﬀerent from the ones reported in Table 6. However, for
low values of the relative cash intensity parameter, i.e. θ = 1 and θ = 2, the optimal interest rates
with the alternative speciﬁcation of the cash-in-advance constraint are lower than before. This is
intuitive, since the government would choose to use the inﬂation tax less if more cash were needed
in the formal sector due to consumption taxes on the cash good. However, this diﬀerence gets
smaller as θ increases. As the informal sector uses cash more intensively, the welfare gain of the
formal sector from lower inﬂation tax becomes less important than the inﬂation ‘tax revenue’ loss
of the government. Hence for θ = 5 the optimal interest rates based on the two cash-in-advance
constraints are much closer to each other. Thus the conclusions in the main text apply here as
well.
17References
Cagan, Phillip. 1958. “The Demand for Currency Relative to the Total Money Supply.” Journal
of Political Economy 66 (4): 302–328.
Cavalcanti, Tiago, and Anne Villamil. 2003. “The Optimal Inﬂation Tax and Structural Re-
form.” Macroeconomic Dynamics 7 (3): 333–362 (June).
Chari, V.V., Lawrence J. Christiano, and Patrick Kehoe. 1996. “Optimality of the Friedman
Rule in Economies with Distorting Taxes.” Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (April):
203–223.
Chari, V.V., and Patrick Kehoe. 1999. “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy.” In Handbook of
Macroeconomics, edited by John Taylor and Michael Woodford, Volume 1c. Elsevier.
Correia, Isabel, and Pedro Teles. 1999. “The Optimal Inﬂation Tax.” Review of Economic
Dynamics 2 (2): 325–346 (April).
de Fiore, Fiorella. 2000. “The Optimal Inﬂation Tax when Taxes are Costly to Collect.”
European Central Bank Working Paper, no. 38 (November).
Koreshkova, Tatyana. 2001. Accounting for Inﬂation Rates in Developing Countries. Manuscript,
University of Western Ontario.
Lemieux, Thomas, Bernard Fortin, and Pierre Frechette. 1994. “The Eﬀects of Taxes on Labor
Supply in the Underground Economy.” The American Economic Review 84 (1): 231–254
(March).
Nicolini, Juan Pablo. 1998. “Tax Evasion and the Optimal Inﬂation Tax.” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics 55 (1): 215–232 (February).
OECD. 2004. “Tax Administration in OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series.”
Technical Report, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.
¨ O˘ g¨ un¸ c, Fethi, and G¨ okhan Yılmaz. 2000. “Estimating the Underground Economy in Turkey.”
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Discussion Paper.
Schneider, Friedrich, and Dominik Enste. 2000. “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Conse-
quences.” Journal of Economic Literature 38 (1): 77–114 (March).
18Tanzi, Vito. 1980. “The Underground Economy in the United States: Estimates and Implica-
tions.” Banca Nazionale del Lavaro 134 (4): 427–453.
. 1983. “The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates, 1930-1980.”
IMF Staﬀ Papers 30 (2): 283–305.
Ye¸ sin, Pınar. 2004. “Tax Collection Costs, Tax Evasion and Optimal Interest Rates.” Study
Center Gerzensee Working Paper, no. 04.02.
19Table 1: Tax Collection Costs
Administrative Costs/
Country Net Revenue Collections (%)
2000 2001 2002 average
Australia 1.11 1.27 1.19 1.19
Canada 1.07 1.08 1.20 1.12
Denmark n.a. n.a. 0.73 0.73
Italy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Korea 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.83
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Norway n.a. 0.56 0.59 0.58
Portugal 1.60 1.61 1.68 1.63
Spain n.a. 0.81 0.78 0.80
Turkey 1.94 2.12 0.86 1.64
US 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.47
Source: OECD (2004) estimates based on country survey responses and annual reports of revenue
bodies.
20Table 2: Net Nominal Interest Rates, Seigniorage Revenues, the Size of the Govern-
ment and the Size of the Informal Sector (1976-2000)
Country Interest Rate§ Seigniorage? Government Size† Informal Sector‡ Tax Revenue∗
(%) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Australia 11.54 0.36 19.16 10.1-15.3 28.67
Canada 8.86 0.25 19.82 10.0-13.5 35.04
Denmark 7.20 0.62 26.01 9.4-16.9 46.95
Italy 12.22 0.59 18.17 19.6-24.0 36.68
Korea 7.56 0.92 10.53 20.3-38.0 19.06
Mexico 30.80 2.90 10.09 27.1-49.0 17.62
Norway 9.11 0.38 20.06 5.9-16.7 41.78
Portugal 14.69 0.85 16.49 15.6-16.8 28.45
Spain 10.80 0.96 14.90 16.1-22.9 29.43
Turkey 43.17 3.14 11.46 15.7-46.2 21.92
U.S. 6.67 0.39 19.75 6.7-13.9 26.61
Source:
§ : 25-year averages of end-of-period discount rates, series 60 of the International Financial
Statistics.
? : 25-year averages of change in reserve money divided by nominal GDP, series 14 and 99b of
the International Financial Statistics, respectively.
† : Government sizes are computed as the ratio of government consumption expenditures to
domestic output, series 91f and 99b of the International Financial Statistics, respectively. They
are averages over the period 1976-2000.
‡ : Informal sector size estimates are taken from Schneider and Enste (2000) except for Turkey
which is taken from ¨ O˘ g¨ un¸ c and Yılmaz (2000). The numbers are ratios of output produced by
the informal sector to output produced by the formal sector in a year, for the period 1989-1993.
The output of the informal sector can be estimated using a variety of methods: Surveys and tax
audits are examples of the direct approach; currency demand method, physical input (electricity
consumption) method, and the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes model are examples of the
indirect approach. A range implies that more than one method was used for that country.
∗ : Tax revenue data is taken from SourceOECD, and GDP from International Financial Statistics.
21Table 3: Baseline Values
R τ σ κ i v m θ
US 1.0667 0.2661 2 0.9953 0.1030 0.1975 0.1508 1
Table 4: Baseline Parameters
a b c d g
US 0.0850 0.0174 0.1528 0.7447 0.1945
22Table 5: Base Values for the Other Countries
R τ σ κ i v m
Australia 1.1154 0.2867 2 0.9881 0.1270 0.1916 0.1366
Canada 1.0886 0.3504 2 0.9888 0.1175 0.1982 0.0776
Denmark 1.0720 0.4695 2 0.9927 0.1315 0.2601 0.3168
Italy 1.1222 0.3668 2 0.9900 0.2180 0.1817 0.3903
Korea 1.0756 0.1906 2 0.9917 0.2915 0.1053 0.2819
Mexico 1.3080 0.1762 2 0.9900 0.3805 0.1009 0.0925
Norway 1.0911 0.4178 2 0.9943 0.1130 0.2006 0.2439
Portugal 1.1469 0.2845 2 0.9837 0.1620 0.1649 0.2712
Spain 1.1080 0.2943 2 0.9921 0.1950 0.1490 0.2573
Turkey 1.4317 0.2192 2 0.9836 0.3095 0.1146 0.0725
23Table 6: Annual Net Nominal Interest Rates (%) — Actual and Ramsey Values:
Varying Relative Cash-intensity of the Informal Sector
Country Actual Interest Rate Optimal Optimal Optimal Ye¸ sin (2004)
average (1976-2000) when θ = 1 when θ = 2 when θ = 5
Australia 11.54 8.08 9.97 12.77 11.31
Canada 8.86 7.31 9.42 12.92 10.83
Denmark 7.20 11.20 13.00 14.94 19.38
Italy 12.22 9.79 10.74 11.75 18.13
Korea 7.56 5.75 6.61 7.62 11.67
Mexico 30.80 6.02 7.40 9.16 14.27
Norway 9.11 6.19 7.66 9.52 9.22
Portugal 14.69 9.82 10.86 12.13 11.83
Spain 10.80 6.50 7.72 9.23 11.46
Turkey 43.17 7.77 9.29 11.36 20.06
US 6.67 5.42 7.28 10.02 8.12
Source: International Financial Statistics, the author’s estimations based on the model, and
optimal interest rates reported in Ye¸ sin (2004).
24Table 7: Seigniorage Revenue
% of GDP % of Gov. Exp.
Country Actual Optimal Actual Optimal
(1976-2000) θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 5 (1976-2000) θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 5
Australia 0.36 0.64 0.86 1.16 1.61 3.42 4.60 6.23
Canada 0.25 0.31 0.45 0.66 1.08 1.62 2.35 3.47
Denmark 0.62 2.30 2.74 3.18 2.04 9.27 11.06 12.87
Italy 0.59 2.39 2.68 2.97 1.73 14.19 15.94 17.70
Korea 0.92 0.71 0.92 1.17 6.26 7.04 9.17 11.59
Mexico 2.90 0.72 0.40 0.55 11.48 3.84 4.13 5.66
Norway 0.38 0.91 1.04 1.42 1.09 4.87 5.54 7.58
Portugal 0.85 1.68 1.91 2.18 2.18 10.81 12.28 14.01
Spain 0.96 0.83 1.11 1.43 4.84 5.92 7.89 10.20
Turkey 3.14 0.35 0.59 0.94 15.18 3.26 3.01 4.80
U.S. 0.39 0.33 0.46 0.59 1.26 1.71 4.21 5.45
Source: International Financial Statistics and the author’s estimations based on the model.
25Table 8: Tax Rates (%)
Average† Optimal
Country (1976-2000) θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 5
Australia 28.67 21.55 21.24 20.78
Canada 35.04 22.74 22.54 22.21
Denmark 46.95 28.25 27.50 26.71
Italy 36.68 15.62 15.20 14.77
Korea 19.06 9.39 9.13 8.83
Mexico 17.62 10.04 9.91 9.74
Norway 41.78 21.18 20.75 20.21
Portugal 28.45 15.25 14.93 14.54
Spain 29.43 14.34 13.99 13.56
Turkey 21.92 11.42 11.30 11.14
U.S. 26.61 23.23 22.88 22.37
Source: SourceOECD and the author’s estimations based on the model.
†: Average tax rate for each country was approximated by Net Tax Revenue/GDP.
26Table 9: How much Tax Revenue is Optimal to Finance Government Spending
Optimal†
Country θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 5
Australia 94.00 92.67 90.73
Canada 96.99 96.16 94.84
Denmark 85.75 83.60 81.35
Italy 77.23 75.21 73.15
Korea 83.90 81.63 79.01
Mexico 93.76 92.38 90.68
Norway 91.84 89.99 87.71
Portugal 82.67 80.96 78.91
Spain 87.96 85.82 83.24
Turkey 94.17 93.10 91.67
U.S. 95.79 94.38 92.36
Source: SourceOECD and the author’s estimations based on the model.
†: Gross tax revenue as a percentage of government total expenditures in the Ramsey equilibrium.
27Table 10: Optimal Annual Net Nominal Interest Rates Using the Alternative Cash-
in-Advance Constraint (%)
Country Actual Interest Rate Optimal Optimal Optimal
average (1976-2000) when θ = 1 when θ = 2 when θ = 5
Australia 11.54 6.25 7.96 10.83
Canada 8.86 5.59 7.38 10.74
Denmark 7.20 7.44 9.46 12.10
Italy 12.22 7.82 9.16 10.71
Korea 7.56 5.14 6.10 7.29
Mexico 30.80 5.43 6.85 8.75
Norway 9.11 4.47 5.88 7.98
Portugal 14.69 8.09 9.31 10.94
Spain 10.80 5.34 6.65 8.43
Turkey 43.17 6.94 8.48 10.73
US 6.67 3.93 5.51 8.15
Source: International Financial Statistics and the author’s estimations based on the model.
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